“The memories of letting loose armed gangs in the east after the Indian peace Keeping Force (IPKF) left the island in 1990 provide a gruesome lesson for the state in handling the issue casually. The east was handed over to the LTTE control by a clever President Premadasa to lay the rule of law on the then Chief Minister Varadaraja Perumal who had made a misguided unilateral declaration of independence for the northeast in his last hurrah. The LTTE went on a rampage and in the blood bath that followed it killed at least a thousand Tamil youth who had put their faith in the government.”
Political developments in Sri Lanka have been as rapid as the abnormal deluge that has bogged down the troops in the forward lines of north. There had been some realignment of political fronts as the country approached the May 10 deadline for the first ever provincial council elections in the east since the de-merger of the north-eastern province. Ideally this should be a healthy development. But Sri Lanka, like many other democracies in the neighbourhood, is caught in the vortex of populist politics, and disregard for scruples in the quest for power among political parties. The battle array of the two fronts reflects s this politics sans principles with focus on issues of power rather than commitment to ideals.
Specifically, two unhealthy but interconnected political developments that could become hazardous for national security are evident in this political exercise. The first and more insidious development is legitimisation of the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Padaigal (TMVP) as a political party without disarming it and anointing it as a partner of the ruling United Peoples Freedom Alliance (UPFA). The second is the potential powder keg of growing feeling of alienation among Muslims in the east in the emerging provincial political dispensation.
Legitimising the TMVP
TMVP has a murky history that is almost wholly militant and non-political. It is a product of miscegenation of soured militancy and failed quest for power through the use of arms. It owes its origins to Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan alias Karuna (to be factually correct a.k.a Kokila Dushmantha Gunawardena), the Batticaloa leader of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) who broke up with Prabhakaran in March 2004. The LTTE's major preoccupation in the early years of Karuna's exit was typical – to gun him and his followers down. Karuna made a half hearted attempt at politics. This was apparently beyond his ken as surviving LTTE pistol group assassins became the top priority. Ultimately this preoccupation became a zero sum game that ended any political role for him. But it provided Karuna and the TMVP a legitimate (at least from their point of view) reason to retain the arms they had brought along when they quit the LTTE fold. In any case, the state had neither the inclination nor the determination to disarm yet another Tamil militant group in its own back yard, particularly when it was fighting the LTTE with the TMVP assisting it to effectively curb the LTTE activity.
Karuna became a war lord of sorts ruling the Tamil areas. The cadres helped the Sri Lankan military operations that intensified from 2005 onwards. Initially they operated collectively in groups and later individually. They occupied the power vacuum created amidst the Tamil population as the territory was cleared of LTTE control. Karuna had problems in visibly exercising his command mainly due to absentee landlordism and continued LTTE threat to his life. The effective leadership power was wielded by Pillayan, his second in command. The security forces appear to have preferred him as he was eager, willing and available to go along with the security forces operations. Pillayan climbed up to the top of the leadership ladder after the TMVP eased out Karuna from the leadership making some accusations of financial misappropriation of party funds against him.
The TMVP activities were not endearing them to others. Their actions related more to a vigilante militia than a political party. There were innumerable complaints against the behaviour of armed TMVP cadres roaming around the Tamil and at times Muslim areas from many quarters. They included Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission, the four co-chairs of the Tokyo Donors Conference, political parties of all hues, community leaders, civil society organisations, highly reputed international and local not for profit organisations, and human rights and humanitarian organs of the United Nations.
The list of TMVP misconduct included the whole range of offences in the penal code - extortion, child recruitment, 'tax collection,' kidnapping, intimidation, muzzling the media, and even killings. There were accusations of army colluding with TMVP in some of these actions either by ignoring or participating in the misdeeds. Demands for disarming the TMVP were as loud as the deadly silence of the government response to the demands. The Sri Lanka government had to take some action to satisfy the mounting international criticism against the TMVP and probably Karuna, now without power and following, became probably a willing fall guy.
The TMVP without Karuna but under Pillayan became an important partner of the UPFA alliance when it contested the local body polls in Batticaloa district a month ago. Of course, the elections were by and large peaceful and polling was heavy. The TMVP cadres did not display their hardware during the elections according to the government. This point has been disputed by some of the political parties and civil society bodies. That is immaterial because the TMVP still retains the weapons. TMVP won eight of the nine local bodies. The UPFA alliance won the ninth - the Batticaloa council. The government show-cased the local body elections to the international audience as the coming of age of democracy in the east. In a way it was a coming of age, but of politicisation of extremism. This is where the genuineness and credibility of the forthcoming PC polls hang now.
The issue is not simply one of legitimising TMVP; but legitimising extrajudicial role of armed groups to operate politically in areas of their choosing, while the rule of law is consigned to the books. Though the TMVP might be more inclined to assume a political role, it has to disarm itself to become a legitimate political party as other Tamil militant groups had done in the past. Only that would be an affirmation of its faith in the power of the ballot rather than the bullet. Even in Nepal, the Maoist arms were mothballed before they participated in the elections.
The memories of letting loose armed gangs in the east after the Indian peace Keeping Force (IPKF) left the island in 1990 provide a gruesome lesson for the state in handling the issue casually. The east was handed over to the LTTE control by a clever President Premadasa to lay the rule of law on the then Chief Minister Varadaraja Perumal who had made a misguided unilateral declaration of independence for the northeast in his last hurrah. The LTTE went on a rampage and in the blood bath that followed it killed at least a thousand Tamil youth who had put their faith in the government.
The bottom line is security of ordinary people is the responsibility of the state. It cannot deputise it to warlords or irregular militias. If the state cannot ensure personal security, how can it conduct free and fair elections in the true democratic spirit? History is replete with examples of how politics and guns in a democracy cannot coexist.. Pakistan in our own neighbourhood has been sapped of its strength due to not adhering to this simple truth. It is still reaping the bitter fruits of ignoring a simple basic dictum - only politics and not guns can have a place in democracy.
A second aspect is such moves set a bad precedence in future negotiations for peace with the LTTE. Ultimately the future of the armed LTTE cadres has to be decided. Even during the IPKF's early palaver with the LTTE, the cadres' future was discussed. If they are to retain their arms, they have to be part of a legitimate force of the state accountable to the organs of the constitution. From this count, this political move to take TMVP within the UPFA fold without disarming it could weaken state's case in future negotiations as and when they take place with LTTE (no harm in hoping I suppose). It also sends the message that as long as such extremist groups maintain their identity and remain politically useful they can get away with anything and exist outside the pale of law.
The only regime that had been practising such black tactics is Burma where the military junta has signed ceasefire agreements with a large number of ethnic insurgent groups. They have been allowed to retain their structure, put on a state retainer, and act as government proxies in their regions with detrimental results. A few powerful groups have been allowed to retain their arms and they are virtually ruling the roost. A few other groups are into profitable poppy cultivation and have become bastions of drug traffic causing concern to both China and the rest of the world. These groups have encouraged illegal arms traffic to feed insurgencies in India's northeast and Bangladesh.
Sri Lanka is politically far more advanced than Burma to fall into such easy but risky subterfuge in handling the TMVP. A suspicion that the removal of Special Task Force (STF) personnel from 10 posts before the election was carried out at the behest of the TMVP persists in the minds of many commentators. If this is true it is an unhealthy beginning for the new "political role" of the TMVP. With Pillayan already speaking of his aspirations to be chief minister of the eastern provincial council (and why not if he wins majority seats!) the credibility of the government exercise in "liberating the people of the east from LTTE control" and ushering in democracy would be low. One can only hope at least after the elections are over, the disarming of TMVP would follow. It is never too late to start what is good for the people.
Lastly, there is the global threat of small arms proliferation in which insurgent and militant groups' contribution is at least a million weapons. In South Asia alone at least 100,000 to 200,000 are in the hands of insurgent groups, past and present. This figure does not include weapons in the hands of criminal gangs. Sri Lanka has a sizeable contribution to the stockpile of such unaccounted arms that are floating in the sub continent. This encourages a host of crimes – smuggling, corruption of government officials, human traffic, and illicit arms and drug traffic. The pilot survey of the Hambantota district by the National Commission Against Illicit Proliferation of Small Arms Sri Lanka has clearly shown how the illicit weapons from north and east are contributing to crime even in a Sinhala majority district. So how can there be normal political life in the east, with illicit arms in the hands of legitimately elected representatives? Only the people of Sri Lanka can answer this question.
Part 2- Rise in Muslim Discontent
The political style of Sri Lanka President Mahinda Rajapaksa and his use of military option in handling the Tamil insurgency have split almost all political parties which have been compelled to make hard political choices. Starting with the United National Party (UNP), the latest episode in the "split-story" is the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP).The smaller parties did not split but joined the ruling United Peoples Freedom Alliance (UPFA) bandwagon enjoying the perks of office. Those who have resisted have generally put paid for their demeanour. But the hardest hit in this political maelstrom is the Muslim political leadership, notably the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC).
No Muslim leader has so far been able to truly fill the leadership void created after the assassination of Mohammad Hussein Muhammad Ashraff, who gave a vision to the SLMC in the national sphere. He gave a new thrust to the SLMC's emergence as a representative body of Muslims in 1986. The rise of Ashraff was in a way path breaking because for the first time the poorer and marginalised Tamil speaking Muslims of the east had a leader who created space for them in Sri Lanka politics. Till then individual Muslim leaders made their mark by toeing the Sinhala line within the two major political parties. It was Ashraff who struck his own path and developed the SLMC and the Muslim constituency as an independent entity and worked out political equations on handling the Tamils and Sinhalas. This was very important at that time as Muslims were caught between the increasingly violent confrontation between Sinhalas and Tamils - the two larger communities.
After the death of Ashraff, the SLMC lost not only its shine but its direction as well. It has been split, at least into three major entities. Rauf Hakeem a lieutenant of Ashraff took over the major chunk of SLMC considering himself political heir to Ashraff, while Ferial Ashraff, wife of the late Ashraff, joined the UPFA coalition with her faction.
With the fourth edition of the Eelam War raging in the north, the sharing of power between ethnic communities is as yet an undecided issue. With President Rajapaksa representing the larger section of Southern Sinhala viewpoint, both the Tamil and Muslim communities need strong and unified leaderships to workout an equitable solution to power sharing.
Among Muslim leaders, particularly of the SLMC, the peace process 2002 created a feeling of disappointment. The peace talks between the government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) excluded direct and separate representation to the Muslim community, who inhabit large areas in the northeast. They feared the devolution process would bypass Muslim interests by default. Efforts of Rauf Hakeem to muscle into the process through direct deal with Prabhakaran, the LTTE leader, resulted in empty words. The demand for equitable role for Muslms in the peace process on their own right was never taken seriously by other stakeholders including the international community.
Similar was the experience of the Muslim community which bore a major brunt of the devastation of the tsunami strike in December 2005. Their relief measures were slow in coming. And they were unhappy that their woes did not get the adequate attention they deserved. These experiences have glaringly showed the inadequacy of Muslim leadership to articulate their viewpoint.
These came on top of a similar experience in the past when India actively intervened in the period 1983 to 1987 in support of the Tamil cause that culminated in the India- Sri Lanka Agreement 1987. Then also the Muslim community felt their interests had been marginalised in the devolution stakes. At that time the Muslim polity had no independent articulation but had tried to find a place within the leadership of the two major national parties. And the elections taking place now in the east are only a resurgence of the very same form of provincial level devolution. So it will probably revive the old fears of alienation. And the Muslim population is politically more conscious than ever before. So the feeling of alienation could be stronger if the elections are not conducted fairly.
Muslim leadership and the PC elections
With the President talking of democratisation of the east, the time has come for Muslims to demand a share of the pie in the power structure. This would also set precedence for their share in power in the national dispensations in the future as and when the war ends (!). If the Muslim leaders fail to achieve this they are likely to be become non entities in the eyes of the people. This has created a crisis of sorts for the Muslim polity in participating in the forthcoming provincial council elections in the eastern province. The crisis has three major facets.
The first relates to handling President Rajapaksa's desire to play an assertive role in the east, so that the ruling UPFA coalition (and as a corollary Sri Lanka Freedom Party –SLFP) can gain a firm foothold cashing upon their military success against the LTTE. Rajapaksa has shown remarkable political savvy in understanding the weakness of Muslim leadership which is split and easily satisfied with political pickings. So he struck a deal with the community leaders (Jamaat) directly and that acted as a hidden persuader in working out support for the UPFA. Only Rauf Hakeem of the SLMC appears to be trying to be free of the "Rajapaksa embrace" perhaps to save his own identity as the true successor of MHM Ashraff.
Rauf Hakeem's fears are not unjustified. The President's new thrust lines of politics in the east involve coalition with the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP), who are still armed and have a dubious record of acts of violence and intimidation against Muslims. If TMVP establishes itself in the corridors of power, life could become difficult for Muslims. Moreover, in the near term, if the President succeeds it could end the carefully nuanced Muslim leadership's tactics of "milking" maximum benefit out of the traditional antagonism between the SLFP and its bête noire the UNP. In some distant future it holds the potential to evolve a Tamil-Sinhala political coalition at the cost of Muslim interests in the power play. This unlikely happening could throw the Muslims into political wilderness.
The second facet relates to the importance the eastern provincial council elections hold for Muslim political identity. The fact that three senior Muslim members of parliament resigned their membership to participate in the provincial council poll shows this. This comes out of what they feel as justifiable claims to have an elected body of their choice with a Muslim chief minister. This is not an unrealistic thought. By most counts (though often unreliable) Muslims have emerged as the biggest population group in the east touching around 42 per cent of the total. It is this desire to capture power that has made two prominent Muslim leaders - Hizbullah and Rauf Hakeem - choose opposite political camps. Hizbullah has chosen to partner the UPFA while Hakeem is going along with the UNP agreeing to put up candidates of SLMC to contest with UNP symbol. His choice is probably driven by the fear of Rajapaksa's domination which he perceives as Southern Sinhala assertion.
Lastly, the success of the Muslim leaders in the election is going to determine the pecking order of Muslim leadership in the national sphere. But with the TMVP domination of the Batticaloa district and the uncertain dimensions of Sinhala support in what had been traditional UNP strongholds, any split in Muslim votes could result in the diminution of an independent Muslim political articulation. So far the Muslim politicians have been able to achieve much using their clout with whosoever is in power. But the moment the relevance of their support diminishes such achievements could become uncertain.
The security threat
Some of the problems faced by Sri Lanka's Muslim population are similar to those faced by Muslims in many countries where they are a minority. These are mostly related to the inherent contradictions within the Muslim Ummah in reconciling increased assertion of Islamic identity with that of national one. Thanks to the more accommodative Sufi beliefs of most of the Sri Lankan Muslims to a large extent this problem has been managed well despite periodic confrontation with the increasing spread of fundamentalist Wahabi influence.
Despite minor sectarian skirmishes between the two, so far the community has managed to keep them within manageable proportions, thanks to the pragmatic approach of Muslim population and its leaders. If there is a perceived threat to the Muslim identity the Wahabis are likely to take advantage and use it as a lever to spread their influence. And it is good to remember that unfettered spread of Wahabi influence has led to the growth of aggressive fundamentalism of the Taliban type in many countries. Similar potential exists in arming Muslim private militias which could come into being as a response to TMVP depredation if it continues after the elections. And political disillusionment is the first step to these unhealthy developments.
The observation of International Crisis Group on the subject in their report of May 29, 2007 aptly sums up the whole situation: There is no guarantee that this commitment to non-violence will continue, particularly given the frustration noticeable among younger Muslims in the Eastern province. In some areas there are Muslim armed groups but they are small and not a major security threat. Fears of armed Islamist movements emerging seem to be exaggerated, often for political ends. Small gangs have been engaged in semi-criminal activities and intra-religious disputes, but there is a danger they will take on a role in inter-communal disputes if the conflict continues to impinge upon the security of co-religionists.
Such a development should not be dismissed casually. The weakened Muslim leadership could well be swept aside if the community loses its confidence in the present scheme of things. (In this context, it is probably too early to comment on the impact of Pakistan President Musharraf's generous offer to help Sri Lanka's fight against terror. But when such an offer comes from a leader, who had unhesitatingly used the same terror weapon in neighbouring countries in the past through proxies guided by the ISI machinery it has dangerous portends.) This should be the last thing all communities in this troubled province need. To avoid such a development, the work is cut out for all stakeholders in and out of power to ensure a fair representation for all communities. Specifically the needs of the hour are as follows
The administration should run a free and fair election without stuffing of ballots or intimidation to keep voters away from exercising their franchise. The UPFA leadership in particular should run a tight ship avoiding the temptation to use the TMVP muscle power to ensure victory, as the opposition is already voicing their suspicion. One way of achieving this is to have international election observers present during the election process and providing unfettered media access during the run up to the elections and voting.
Have a proactive internal security plan in place to ensure communal confrontation does not erupt even accidentally.
Muslim leadership inside the coalitions should ensure the tradeoffs are not short term. It is high time the leadership united on major issues of community and national interests rather than think on personal considerations. A major weakness is the leadership's inability to think and act proactively. This can come through if only the work out a larger consultative coalition outside party folds to serve the common interests of the community.
(Col. R Hariharan, a retired Military Intelligence specialist on South Asia, served as the head of intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka 1987-90.He is associated with the South Asia Analysis Group and the Chennai Centre for China Studies. E-mail: colhari@yahoo.com)- Sri Lanka Guardian
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